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, I:

1. Lisa A Rickard, Delaware Flirts with Encouraging Shareholder Lawsuits, WALL
ST. J. (Nov. 14, 2014), http://www.wsj.com/articles/lisa-rickard-delaware-flirts-with-encour
aging-shareholder-lawsuits-1416005328,
2. CORNERSTONE RESEARCH, SECURITIES CLASS ACTION FILINGS-2013 YEAR IN
REVIEW 1 (2014), available at https://www.cornerstone.com/GetAttachment/d88bd52725b5-4c54-8d 40-2b 13da0d0779/Securities-Class-Action-Filings-2013-Year-in-Review. pdf.
While there has been a decline in the number of filings in recent years, there was an increase in the number of filings from 2012 to 2013. Id.
3. Id. at 1, 7.
4. 15 U.S.C. § 78j(b) (2012).
5. Class Action: An Overview, LEGAL INFO. INST., https://www.law.cornell.edu/wex/
class_action (last visited Apr. 3, 2015).
6. See infra notes 38-39 and accompanying text.
7. SEC. EXCH. CoMM'N, How CAN INVESTORS GET MONEY BACK IN A FRAUD CASE
INVOLVING A VIOh'\TION OF THE FEDERAL SECURITIES LAWS?, http://www.sec.gov/answers
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8. See infra Part III; U.S. CHAMBER INST. FOR LEGAL REFORM, ECONOMIC
CONSEQUENCES: THE REAL COSTS OF U.S. SECURITIES CLASS ACTION LITIGATION 5-6 (Feb.
2014).
9. The corporation's sacrifice is explained as a double-edged sword due to the potential effects on discovery at the class certification stage. See infra Part I.C.
10. Investing in stock is not risk free. The risk analysis of stock investing is outside
the scope of this article. The point here is that if corporations are not burdened by heavy
litigation costs, presumably the corporation will be able to invest those savings in other
areas, which would hopefully add value to the company and ultimately increase the value
of the shareholder's stock. See infra Part I.C.
11. See infra Part II.B.i (identifying the corporate contract doctrine); Part II.C (identifying policy concerns related to federal preemption).
12. From 2006 to 2010, 40% of securities class action suits settled, 32% were dismissed with prejudice, 11 % were voluntarily dropped, leaving only 18% of cases moving
forward. Michael Klausner, Jason Hegland & Matthew Goforth, VVhen Are Securities Class
Actions Dismissed, VVhen Do They Settle, and For How Much? An Update, 26 PROF.
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the inability to be certified as a class can
frivolous claim. This is because
class-wide reliance is also the foundation
5 class action claim. 17 Essentially, if
dence to win at
they should not
LIABILITY UNDERWRITING Soc'Y J. 1 fig. 1 (photo. reprint 2013) (2013), available at http:
//securities.stanford.edu/academic-articles/20130101-when-securities-class-actions-dismiss
ed-when-settle-for-how-much. pdf.
13. Daniel Fisher, Study Shows Consumer Class-Action Lawyers Earn Millions, Clients Little, FORBES (Dec. 11, 2013), http://www.forbes.com/sites/danielfisher/2013/12/ll/
with-consumer-class-actions-lawyers-are-mostly-paid-to-do-nothing/.
14. 485 U.S. 224 (1988); see infra Part I.A
15. See infra Part I.A
16. See infra Part I.C.
17. See Basic, 485 U.S. at 247.
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settling before trial (before or during the class
At this point, should the case be dismissed,
should not be liable for paying the plaintiffs'
shifting fees to the plaintiffs if they do not
extent), 18 plaintiffs will need to put their money
mouths are. On the other hand, with the increased
ery requirements, both parties and the court will be more aware
actual fraud and damage that took place, if any, which
lead to a more definitive compensation figure
acts.
I discusses the current landscape of securities class
It explains how and why the suits are initiated and
outcome of Halliburton Co. v. Erica
John
19
Part discusses the framework for the proposithis comment. It provides a brief history of significant casincorporates several recent cases that have opened
to
possibility of implementing fee-shifting clauses.
with a comparison to other contractual provisions curimplemented by corporations and also analyzes
provisions under federal preemption. Part
implementing fee-shifting provisions solves many of the
concerns raised by Halliburton II. Part IV discusses several imand possible future actions that are readily
regarding fee-shifting provisions.

I. CURRENT LANDSCAPE OF SHAREHOLDER SECURITIES
LITIGATION

plaintiffs can bring suits alleging various violations
laws, 20 the scope of this comment is focused on
a lOb-5 violation. Further limiting the scope of
proposed solution is aimed at affecting class
claims in which the plaintiffs are attempting class cerHH'-'a~wu based on a "fraud-on-the-market" ("FOM") presumption
The development of the fraud-on-the-market

See infra Part III.
573 U.S._, 134 S. Ct. 2398 (2014); see infra Part I.
Such other claims deal with mergers and acquisitions, Chinese Reverse Mergers,
and violations of other sections of federal and state securities laws. See CORNERSTONE
RESEARCH, supra note 2, at 7 fig. 6 (listing numerous kinds of allegations).
18.

19.
20.
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1.

A Section IO(b) and Fraud-on-the-Market Presumption of
Reliance
The Securities and Exchange Act of 1934 ("'34 Act") created
Securities and Exchange Commission ("SEC") to help enforce a
21
newly enacted regime of federal securities laws. Under the authority of section lO(b) of the '34 Act, the SEC issued Rule lOb-5
("lOb-5"), an anti-fraud provision that covered both the purchase
and sale of securities. 22 While there is no express private right of
action contained in the statutes or rules, the Supreme Court has
recognized an implied private right of action for lOb-5 violations
since 1946. 23
One of the elements that plaintiffs must prove in order to recover damages under lOb-5 claims is reliance, 24 which is the most
relevant element to this comment. Essentially, plaintiffs must
prove that the defendant made a material misrepresentation or
omission on which the plaintiff relied in deciding to purchase or
sell securities. 25 Proof of reliance is fundamental to the court's
analysis because it "provides the requisite causal connection be26
tween a defendant's misrepresentation and a plaintiffs injury."
The Supreme Court, in Basic Inc. v. Levinson ("Basic"), recognized that requiring individual proof of direct reliance from every
21. Steven A Ramirez, The Virtues of Private Securities Litigation: An Historic and
Macroeconomic Perspective, 45 LOY. U. CHI. L.J. 669, 681 (2014). A year prior to the enactment of the '34 Act, the Securities Act of 1933 was enacted, requiring full disclosure of
initial securities distributions. Id. at 670, 680-81.
22. General Rules and Regulations, Securities Exchange Act of 1934, 240 C.F.R. §
240. lOb-5 (2014); see Ramirez, supra note 21, at 681-82.
23. See Kardon v. Nat'l Gypsum Co., 69 F. Supp. 512, 514 (E.D. Pa. 1946). In 2007,
Justice Ginsburg, writing for the majority in Tellabs, Inc. v. Makar Issues & Rights, Ltd.,
began the opinion by stating, "This Court has long recognized that meritorious private actions to enforce federal antifraud securities laws are an essential supplement to criminal
prosecutions and civil enforcement actions brought, respectively, by the Department of
Justice and the Securities and Exchange Commission." 551 U.S. 308, 313 (2007).
24. Halliburton II, 573 U.S. at_, 134 S. Ct. at 2407 (citing Amgen Inc. v. Conn. Ret.
Plans & Trust Funds, 568 U.S._,_, 133 S. Ct. 1184, 1191-92 (2013)).
25. Id.
26. Basic Inc. v. Levinson, 485 U.S. 224, 243 (1988).
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27. Id. at 242. Class certification is not proper when individual questions of law or fact
predominate over questions of law or fact common to the class. FED. R. CIV. P. 23(b)(3).
28. Basic, 485 U.S. at 245-46.
29. Id. A common example would be the S&P 500. FOM incorporates the "efficient
market hypothesis," a topic that is outside the scope of this comment. It is worth noting
that whether markets are efficient or not is currently debated and further supported by
empirical data. See generally Bradford Cornell & James C. Rutten, Market Efficiency,
Crashes, and Securities Litigation, 81 TUL. L. REV. 443 (2006) (proposing a standard for
efficiency and weighing that standard against others).
30. Basic, 485 U.S. at 246-47.
31. Id.
32. Halliburton II, 573 U.S. _, _, 134 S. Ct. 2398, 2408 (2014).
33. Basic, 485 U.S. at 248.
34. Halliburton II, .573 U.S. at_, 134 S. Ct. at 2416.
35. See Donald C. Langevoort, Basic at Twenty: Rethinking Fraud on the Market, 2009
WIS. L. REV. 151, 152-53 ("Tens of billions of dollars have changed hands in settlements of
lOb-5 lawsuits in the last twenty years as a result of Basic.").

36. Id. at 153;
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37. Richard M.
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36. Id. at 153; see also Jill E. Fisch, The Trouble with Basic: Price Distortion After
Halliburton, 90 WASH. U. L. REV. 895, 896 (2013).
37. Richard M. Phillips & Gilbert C. Miller, The Private Securities Litigation Reform
Act of 1995: Rebalancing Litigation Risks and Rewards for Class Action Plaintiffs, Defendants and Lawyers, 51 Bus. LAW. 1009, 1011-12 (1996) [hereinafter Rebalancing Litigation
Risks].
38. See id. at 1012.
39. Michael A. Perino, Did the Private Securities Litigation Reform Act Work?, 2003 U.
!LL. L. REV. 913, 921.
40. Id. at 914; see Private Securities Litigation Reform Act, Pub. L. No. 104-67, 109
Stat. 737 (1995) (codified in scattered sections of 15 U.S.C.).
41. Perino, supra note 39, at 914.
42. U.S. CHAMBER INST. FOR LEGAL REFORM, supra note 8, at 5.
43. Id.
44. Securities Litigation Uniform Standards Act of 1998, Pub. L. No. 105-353, 112
Stat. 3227 (1998) (codified in scattered sections of 15 U.S.C.); Cecilia A. Glass, Sword or
Shield? Setting Limits on SLUSA's Ever-Growing Reach, 63 DUKE L.J. 1337, 1338 (2014).
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The purpose of this act was to prevent circumvention
the recently created PSLRA by requiring
lOb-5
claims to file in federal court. 45 But as the data above shows, lOb5 claims are still being filed, and more importantly, settling before trial. 46
While the potential for abuse and the settlement dilemma are
still apparent in modern litigation, defendant corporations were
recently given a significant helping hand in rebutting the FOM
presumption. However, the use of this helping hand is likely to
come at a significant cost for the corporation.
C. The Supreme Court Upholds FOM, but Provides

Modification
In 2014, the Supreme Court decided
holding
that defendants are allowed to offer proof against the FOM presumption at class certification. 47 The Court was tasked with deciding whether to overturn or modify Basic. 48 Erica
Fund,
Inc. ("EPJ") alleged that Halliburton Co. ("Halliburton") made a
series of misrepresentations regarding the company's future deal49
ings in an effort to inflate the company's stock price. EPJ asserted that, in response to Halliburton's subsequent corrective disclosures, the company's stock price dropped, thus
to
its shareholders. 50 EPJ then invoked the Basic presumption and
moved to be certified as a class comprised of all
the investors
51
who purchased stock during the period of inflation. The case
made it to the Supreme Court twice. The first time
the
Supreme Court held that class action plaintiffs alleging securities
fraud need not prove loss causation at the class certification stage
order to invoke Basie's presumption. 52
Halliburton

45. 15 U.S.C. § 77p (2012); see Halliburton II, 573 U.S. _, _, 134 S. Ct. 2398, 2426
(2014).
46. U.S. CHAMBER INST. FOR LEGAL REFORM, supra note 8, at 5.
47. 573 U.S. at_, 134 S. Ct. at 2417. "Basie's presumption" and the "FOM presumption" are interchangeable terms.
48. Class Actions-Presumption of Reliance Under SEC Rule 1Ob-5-Halliburton Co.
v. Erica P. John Fund, Inc., 128 HARV. L. REV. 291, 291 (2014).
49. Halliburton II, 573 U.S. at_, 134 S. Ct. at 2405.
50. Id. at_, 134 S. Ct. at 2405-06.
51. Id. at_, 134 S. Ct. at 2406.
52. Id. at_, 134 S. Ct. at 2406-07.
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argued
the evidence it previously introduced to disprove loss
causation also disproved
the misrepresentations had an impact on
stock price. 53 Halliburton contended that without any
price impact, the investors would have to prove individual reliance on
misrepresentations and thus class certification was
improper
the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure ("FRCP")
Rule 23(b)(3). 54 By not considering Halliburton's argument, the
district court certified the class, and the Fifth Circuit affirmed,
stating
while Halliburton's price impact evidence could be
used at
to
the presumption, it could not be used at
55
Thus, the case appeared before the Supreme
second time-this time to address whether price
be introduced at the class certification
Basie's FOM presumption. 56
ultimately decided not to overturn Basic, 57
find that it was proper for defendants to introduce "price impact" evidence at the class certification stage to rebut
presumption. 58 The Court distinguished its decision
recent case in which the Court held that
securities class
plaintiffs do not need to prove materiality
at class certification. 59 The Court found "price impact" fundamental to Basie's presumption since the presumption assumes that in
efficient markets a stock's price reflects all public information,
eluding misrepresentations. 60 "Price impact" necessarily affects
class
Rule 23(b)(3) because "if reliance is to be
shown
the Basic presumption, the publicity and market
efficiency prerequisites must be proved before class certification.
53. Id. at_, 134 S. Ct. at 2406.
54. Id.
55. Id. at_, 134 S. Ct. at 2406-07.
56. Id. at_, 134 S. Ct. at 2407. The Court also accepted the case to reconsider Basie's
presumption itself. Id.
57. Id. Halliburton contended that Basic should be overruled on several grounds. Specifically, Halliburton argued that Basie's presumption: (1) conflicted with Congress's intent in enacting the '34 Act; (2) relied on the markets being efficient which had been empirically disproven; (3) eliminated the reliance element for lOb-5 claims and altered the
burden of proof under Rule 23 class certification; and (4) implicated policy concerns regarding the amount of meritless claims, costs on shareholders, and unnecessary use of judicial resources. Id. at_, 134 S. Ct. at 2408-13.
58. Id. at_, 134 S. Ct. at 2417.
59. Id. at _, 134 S. Ct. at 2416-17; see Amgen Inc. v. Conn. Ret. Plans & Trust
Funds, 568 U.S. _, _, 133 S. Ct. 1184, 1202 (2013).
60. Halliburton II, 573 U.S. at_, 134 S. Ct. at 2416.
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proof of those prerequisites, the fraud-on-the-market
theory underlying the presumption completely collapses, rendering class certification inappropriate." 61 So now defendants may
traduce either direct or indirect evidence showing lack of price
at class certification. 62 Indirect evidence would tend to
show that the misrepresentation was publicly known or that the
was inefficient, as opposed to direct evidence such as reports showing the stock price did not change between the time
when the misrepresentation was made and the time period after
63
corrective statements were made.
At the time of this writing, the effects of
II have
not
come to light, but plenty of scholars
lawyers have ofCourt's decision, revealing a mixed view
fered commentary on
for plaintiffs,
of the results. Some say the decision was a
others believe the opposite,
still others even say the dewill not have any effect. 64 The remainder of this section
deals with the implications regarding the decision in
These implications set forth the problem this comment seeks
to resolve.
Some commentators believe that if Halliburton
appears to
make plaintiffs' case an uphill battle, plaintiffs' lawyers will
65
simply find other avenues to bring such claims. One such avenue would be to assert the misrepresentations as omissions to invoke the presumption of reliance from Affiliated Ute Citizens of
v. United States 66 Depending on the facts of
case, other

61. Id.
62. Id. at_, 134 S. Ct. at 2417.
63. Id. at_, 134 S, Ct. at 2415-16.
64. See e.g., Alison Frankel, SCOTUS Halliburton Ruling Could Backfire for Securities Defendants, REUTERS (June 23, 2014), available at http://blogs.reuters.com/alisonfrankel/2014/06/23/scotus-halliburton -ruling-could-backfire-for-securities-defendants/ (discussing the benefits and burdens for both plaintiffs and defendants); Douglas W. Greene,
First Take on Halliburton II: The Price-Impact Rule May Not Have Much Practical Impact,
D&O DISCOURSE (June 24, 2014), http://www.dandodiscourse.com/2014/06/24/first-take-on
-halliburton-ii-the-price-impact-rule-may-not-have-much-practical-impact/.
65. Greene, supra note 64.
66. Id. The presumption of reliance for omissions created under Affiliated Ute Citizens
of Utah v. United States may be invoked only if there is proof of fraudulent course of business in violation of 10b-(5)(a) or (c). But the omissions must have made affirmative statements false or misleading. Claire Loebs Davis, Halliburton: Is the Fix as Basic as Alleging
Omissions Under Affiliated Ute? Or Is That Too Cute?, D&O DISCOURSE (Jan. 28, 2014),
http://www.dandodiscourse.com/2014/0l/28/halliburton-is .. the-fix-as-basic-as-alleging-omis
sions-under-affiliated-ute-or-is-that-too-cute/; see Affiliated Ute Citizens of Utah v. United
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such avenues could
to allege
of
67
The takeaway from these commentators
not signal the end of securities class

av•;iUi.HO

stronger -'-H"'-'''"~-'tion stage.
issue now becomes a question of
type of "price
evidence
sufficient to
The Supreme
acknowledged
studies,"
regression analysis, that
pact for each individual misrepresentation since
ly use such evidence to show the existence
price
defendants are able to strip away the presumption
misrepresentations they can prove had no
on the
12
renders certification inappropriate under
23(b)(3) as to the specific misrepresentation because
73
would be required to prove actual reliance.
studies, some commentators believe, will turn

States, 406 U.S. 128, 153 (1972).
67. N.Y. CITY BAR AsS'N COMM. ON SEC. LITIG., REPORT ON THE POSSIBLE IMPACT OF
HALLIBURTON II ON SECURITIES CLASS ACTION LITIGATION 80 (May 28, 2014).
68. Basic Inc. v. Levinson, 485 U.S. 224, 249-50 (1988).
69. See, e.g., Halliburton II, 573 U.S._,_, 134 S. Ct. 2398, 2424 (Thomas, J., concurring); Brief for Former SEC Commissioners and Officials and Law Professors as Amici Curiae Supporting Petitioners at 24, Halliburton II, 573 U.S._, 134 S. Ct. 2398 (2014) (No.
13-317) [hereinafter Brief for Former SEC Commissioners and Officials and Law Professors].
70. Brief for Former SEC Commissioners and Officials and Law Professors, supra
note 69, at 22-26 (comparing the attempt of rebuttal to a game of Whack-a-Mole) .
71. Halliburton II, 573 U.S. at_, 134 S. Ct. at 2415. If the study lacked a showing of
price impact regarding the specific misrepresentation at issue, the presumption has no
foundation to rest upon, even if the plaintiffs "event study" showed that the market was
efficient. See id.
72. Aaron M. Streett & Shane Pennington, Basic Instinct: The Supreme Court Confronts the Fraud-on-the-Market Theory, 46 SEC. REG. & L. REP. (BNA) at 1883, 1886 (Sept.
29, 2014).
73. Id.
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experts." 74 Both parties will presumably introduce event studies
as direct evidence of price impact or the lack thereof. A problem
arises when experts come to different conclusions because there
are numerous statistical tools and models that can be used to
produce event studies. 75 This will lead to Daubert challenges regarding expert methodologies. 76
thing seems certain regarding the use of event studiesthe cost of bringing and defending a securities class action claim
increase. In regards to the price impact ruling of Halliburton
Roberta Karmel stated, "It is unlikely this will make lOb-5
cases less expensive, and may even prove inimical to the defeat of
class actions, since it may allow plaintiffs additional discovery in
class certification battles." 77 Other attorneys predict that plainwill incur higher costs to get past class certification, and the
costs of defending such cases will certainly increase. 78 The effects
of an increase in upfront costs seem to only favor plaintiffs. If
plaintiffs defeat price impact defenses at the class certification
stage, they are in a far more favorable position in postcertification settlement negotiations. 79 Furthermore, once defendants oppose class certification based on price impact, plaintiffs
most certainly will make discovery demands on the basis of those
defenses. 80 Again, this will potentially make the plaintiffs' cases
stronger, or strengthen their settlement position, depending on
information is handed over. 81 So even though defendants are
now
to rebut Basie's presumption at the class certification

74. Id.
75. Mark A. Perry & Jonathan C. Dickey, Eight Propositions Regarding the Scope of
Halliburton II, 46 SEC. REG. & L. REP. (ENA) at 1403, 1406 (July 21, 2014).
76. Id. Daubert challenges require courts to determine the reliability and relevance of
expert testimony. See Daubert v. Merrell Dow Pharm., Inc., 509 U.S. 579, 594-95 (1993).
For an in-depth analysis of Daubert challenges pertaining to financial experts, see
PRICEWATERHOUSECOOPER, DAUBERT CHALLENGES TO FINANCIAL EXPERTS: A YEARLY
STUDY OF TRENDS AND OUTCOMES 1 (Apr. 2014), http://www.pwc.com/en_US/us/forensicservices/publications/assets/ daubert-study-2013. pdf.
77. Roberta S. Karmel, Attacked Again, Basic Survives, 46 SEC. REG. & L. REP. (ENA)
at 1347, 1350 (July 14, 2014); see also M. Todd Henderson & Adam C. Pritchard, Halliburton Will Raise Cost of Securities Class Actions, LAW360 (July 2, 2014), https://www.law
3 60. co ml articles/ 5 5 283 9/halliburton -will-raise-cost-of-securities-class-actions.
78. See, e.g., Greene, supra note 64.
79. Frankel, supra note 64.
80. Id.
81. See id.
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stage, the possible economic consequences of such defenses
factor into a defendant's decision to fight the claim or settle.
The last issue of this section is the problem of
shareholder class action suits. The problem does not stem
Halliburton
but rather from the nature of shareholder class
action suits. The problem of circularity increases the costs
gation implicated by Halliburton
and further exacerbates
expense problem. Circularity arises because
shareholder class
action suits, the issuer of the stock (i.e., the defendant corporation) pays the damages, either directly or through directors
officers ("D&O") insurance. 82 The consequence is that
holders themselves are the ones who ultimately bear the cost
such payments. 83 The problem gets more intricate
84
shareholder class differs from current shareholders.
ly, since most cases settle, the damages paid are simply a
of wealth between investors, with attorneys getting a significant
cut. 85 This again leads back to the "race to the courthouse" issue
discussed above, since plaintiffs' attorneys are motivated
to
86
their share of the action as early and often as possible.
cal analysis tends to show that shareholder wealth is actually
87
stroyed due to class action litigation. Most importantly in this
context, after Halliburton II, the costs of litigation are going to
increase without providing any meaningful benefit to
ers because shareholders ultimately bear the costs. As to
plication, M. Todd Henderson succinctly states, "Securities
actions are a costly form of insurance against fraud, and investors
are the ones ultimately footing the bill. Only the lawyers,
88
now, the economists, are enriched."
The FOM presumption provides for class-wide reliance
promotes private enforcement against securities fraud. Since the

82. Jill E. Fisch, Confronting the Circularity Problem in Private Securities Litigation,
2009 WIS. L. REV. 333, 337.
83. Id. For a brief explanation of the effects on shareholders, see U.S. CHAMBER INST.
FOR LEGAL REFORM, supra note 8, at 5-6.
84. See John C. Coffee, Jr., Reforming the Securities Class Action: An Essay on Deterrence and Its Implementation, 106 COLUM. L. REV. 1534, 1556-62 (2006).
85. U.S. CHAMBER INST. FOR LEGAL REFORM, supra note 8, at 5-6.
86. See id. at 5. A more detailed analysis of the circularity problem is outside the
scope of this comment.
87. See id. at 6.
88. Henderson & Pritchard, supra note 77.
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securities class action litigation
Several negative effects of the presumprequired legislative action
judicial modificaSupreme
denied overturning
that would presumably help
implications of rebutting the pret-iuuuwn may in fact leave such litigation
or make them worse. With Basic here to
seek better ways to protect themselves
uil;;aul.UH, which
turn
ultimately protect share-

PROVISIONS TAKE THE SPOTLIGHT

section looks at
contractual relationship between corand shareholders
the corporation's articles of
Specifically, it focuses on fee-shifting
transfer litigation and attorneys fees from a
to shareholder plaintiffs under certain cirsection
discuss the recent Delaware
91
case,
Inc. v. Deutscher Tennis Bund,
sparked a debate on the implementation of fee-shifting
attempt to govern litigation. This section then
provisions with other contractual provisions
currently being used by corporations. The seethe necessary analysis of federal preemption,
as thls comment proposes to apply private contractual agreements to
lOb-5 claims.
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of directors amended the bylaws by
members liable for the corporaId.
89. Langevoort, supra note 35, at 153.
90. See Henderson & Pritchard, supra note 77.
91. 91 A.3d 554 (Del. 2014).
92. Id. at 555. A membership corporation is another term for a closely held corporation or "non-stock" corporation.
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feefacially valid,
was
to noncorporations.99 The Delaware Supreme Court
the specific ATP fee-shifting bylaw is
depends on the manner in which it was

Id. at 556. The amended bylaw reads as follows:
(a) In the event that (i) any [current or prior member or Owner or anyone on
their behalf ("Claiming Party")] initiates or asserts any [claim or counterclaim ("Claim")] or joins, offers substantial assistance to or has a direct financial interest in any Claim against the League or any member or Owner (including any Claim purportedly filed on behalf of the League or any member),
and (ii) the Claiming Party (or the third party that received substantial assistance from the Claiming Party or in whose Claim the Claiming Party had a direct financial interest) does not obtain a judgment on the merits
that substantially achieves, in substance and amount, the full remedy
sought, then each Claiming Party shall be obligated jointly and severally to
reimburse the League and any such member or Owners for all fees, costs and
expenses of every kind and description (including, but not limited to, all reasonable attorneys' fees and other litigation expenses) (collectively, "Litigation
Costs") that the parties may incur in connection with such Claim.

Id.

closely held corpora-

94.
95.
96.
97.
98.
99.

Id. at 556.
Id.; see FED. R. Crv. P. 54.
ATP Tour, 91 A.3d at 556.
Id. at 556-57.
Id. at 557.
Id. at 555, 558.
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adopted and the circumstances under which it was invoked. Bylaws that may otherwise be facially valid will not be enforced if
100
adopted or used for an inequitable purpose."
Immediately after this decision, the Delaware legislature,
urged on by the state plaintiffs' bar, 101 attempted to pass a law
expressly prohibiting fee-shifting provisions in a stock corporation's articles or bylaws. 102 However, in response to protests and
requests from business groups and corporations, the legislature
103
tabled the bill to further study the matter. Currently, the Delaware legislature has not enacted any laws regarding feeshifting.104 Any future action will presumably have an effect on
the analysis and arguments of this comment. While the holding
in ATP Tour is clearly limited to Delaware non-stock corporations, the remainder of this section discusses the holding's possible application to stock corporations. 105
The primary purpose of fee-shifting provisions is to impose a
''loser pays" rule 106 different from the American Rule followed by
Delaware courts, which typically requires parties to pay their
101
own litigation costs. After the holding in ATP Tour, multiple
Delaware corporations adopted such fee-shifting bylaws, and other companies have included fee-shifting provisions in their arti100. Id. at 558.
101. Stephen Bainbridge, Delaware's Decision: Viewing Fee Shifting Bylaws Through a
Public Choice Lens, PROFESSORBAINBRIDGE.COM (Nov. 18, 2014), http://www.professor
bainbridge.com/professorbainbridgecom/2014/11/delawares-decision-viewing-fee-shiftingbylaws-through·a·public-choice-lens.html [hereinafter Bainbridge, Public Choice Lens].
102. Rickard, supra note 1.
103. Id.
104. At the time of this writing, the Delaware legislature had tabled the discussion of
fee-shifting clauses. See Jonathan Starkey, Fee-Shifting Bylaw Bill Tabled Until 2015,
DELAWAREONLINE (June 19, 2014), http://www.delawareonline.com/story/money/business
/2014/06/19/delaware-general-assembly-tables-legal-fee-shifting-bylaw-bill/ 10946611/.
105. For purposes of this comment, further use of the term "corporation" refers to
"stock corporations." This comment specifically identifies any discussion of "non-stock corporations."
106. Stephen Bainbridge, The Case for Allowing Fee Shifting Bylaws as a Privately Ordered Solution to the Shareholder Litigation Epidemic, PROFESSORBAINBRIDGE.COM (Nov.
17, 2014), http://www.professorbainbridge.com/professorbainbridgecom/2014/11/the-casefor-allowing·fee-shifting-bylaws-as-a-privately-ordered-solution-to-the-shareholder-litigat.
html [hereinafter Bainbridge, Privately Ordered Solution].
107. ATP Tour, Inc. v. Deutscher Tennis Bund, 91 A.3d 554, 558 (Del. 2014). Feeshifting closely resembles the English Rule, which requires the losing party to cover the
winning party's litigation costs. See Theodore Eisenberg & Geoffrey P. Miller, The English
Versus the American Rule on Attorney Fees: An Empirical Study of Public Company Contracts, 98 CORNELL L. REV. 327, 329 (2013).
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prepare for initial public offerings ("IPOs"). There
are
between the motives for adopting fee-shifting
prov1s1ons and
arguments that ultimately led the Supreme
Court to
Basie's presumption. Before comparing the relaand analyzing how fee-shifting can help solve some of
the implications from Halliburton II, it would be helpful to lay a
foundation for the application of fee-shifting provisions.
B.

a Foundation for a Strategic Defense

The purpose of this section is to compare fee-shifting provisions
with corporate contract provisions that affect litigation between a
corporation and its shareholders. Corporate bylaws and articles
are generally viewed as contractual relationships between the
corporation and its shareholders. 109 As such, state corporation
laws, specifically those in Delaware, generally allow broad discre110
tion on how corporations choose to operate. The two corporate
contract provisions discussed below are forum-selection clauses
and arbitration clauses. These provisions help lay a foundation
fee-shifting provisions because of their method of adoption,
the reasons behind their adoption, and their enforceability in cases brought
federal court. This section concludes with a federal
preemption analysis, which naturally flows from the comparison
of the other corporate contract provisions.
1. Relationship to Forum-Selection Clauses

lic Choice Lens]_

ed the discussion of
Tabled Until 2015,
;ory/money/business
bill/ 10946611/_
rporation" refers to
m of "non-stock cor-

1s as a Privately OrNBRIDGKCOM (Nov,
m/2014/11/the-caseshareholder-litigat_

8 (DeL 2014), Fee' party to cover the
Miller, The English
iblic Company Con-

Forum-selection clauses in a corporation's articles or bylaws
require
against the corporation to be brought in specific
states and courts. Initially, such forum-selection provisions were
not necessary since the internal affairs doctrine applied to corpo-

108. John C. Coffee, Jr_, Fee Shifting Bylaw and Charter Provisions: Can They Apply in
Federal Court?-The Case for Preemption 1 (Columbia Law Sch. Ctr. for Law and Econ.
Studies, Working Paper No. 498, 2014) [hereinafter Coffee, The Case for Preemption],
available at http://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?Abstract_id=2508973. The difference
between a bylaw adopted by the board of directors and a provi'sion contained in a corporation's articles will be discussed in Part ILB to provide context.
109. See ATP Tour, 91 A3d at 558110. Donald F. Parsons, Jr_ & Joseph R Slights III, The History of Delaware's Business
Courts: Their Rise to Preeminence, 17 Bus, L. TODAY 21, 23 (Mar.-Apr. 2008), The reason
for pointing out Delaware is because the majority of Fortune 500 corporations choose to
incorporate in the state_ Id. at 22.
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111. Verity Winship, Shareholder Litigation by Contract 15 (Mar. 6, 2015) (unpublished manuscript), available at http://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id=
2575668.
112. See RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF CONFLICT OF LAWS§ 302 cmt. g (1971).
113. Winship, supra note 111, at 15-16.
114. Id. at 16.
115. In re Revlon, Inc. S'holders' Litig., 990 A.2d 940, 960 & n.8 (Del. Ch. 2010).
116. See Boilermakers Local 154 Ret. Fund v. Chevron Corp., 73 A.3d 934, 956-57 (Del.
Ch. 2013) (holding that forum-selection clauses unilaterally adopted by the board of directors were facially valid); City of Providence v. First Citizens Bancshares, Inc., 99 A.3d 229,
242 (Del. Ch. 2014) (holding that a Delaware corporation can choose a forum other than
Delaware in a forum-selection clause).
117. 571 U.S._,_, 134 S. Ct. 568, 575 (2013).
118. Id. at_, 134 S. Ct. at 579 (quoting Stewart Org., Inc. v. Ricoh Corp., 487 U.S. 22,
33 (1988)) (Kennedy, J., concurring).
119. Id. at_, 134 S. Ct. at 575.
120. Winship, supra note 111, at 12.
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VIar. 6, 2015) (unirs.cfm ?abstract_id=

; (1971).

!. Ch. 2010).
3d 934, 956-57 (Del.
v the board of direcs, Inc., 99 A.3d 229,
a forum other than

Corp., 487 U.S. 22,

121. Id. at 11.
122. Id.
123. Boilermakers Local 154 Ret. Fund v. Chevron Corp., 73 A.3d 934, 958 (DeL Ch.
2013).
124. Winship, supra note 111 at 10, 28-30.
125. The SEC's registration requirements include disclosure of certain charter provisions. See Coffee, The Case for Preemption, supra note 108, at 8--9. Companies are incentivized to disclose forum selection clauses because it will provide greater enforceability in
court. See Paul Scrivano & Noah Kornblith, Exclusive Forum Bylaws: Further Consideration Recommended, O'MELVENY & MYERS LLP (Mar. 17, 2014), http://www.omm.com/ex
clusive-forum-bylaws-further-consideration-recommended-03-11-2014/.
126. DEL. CODE ANN. tit. 8, § 109(b) (2015) ("The bylaws may contain any provision, not
inconsistent with law or with the certificate of incorporation, relating to the business of
the corporation, the conduct of its affairs, and its rights or powers or the rights or powers
of its stockholders, directors, officers or employees.").
127. Boilermakers, 73 A.3d at 939.
128. Id.
129. See Schnell v. Chris-Craft Indus., Inc., 285 A.2d 437, 439 (Del. 1971); Winship,
supra note 111, at 30.
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contractual relationship between shareholders and the corporapurpose of forum-selection clauses is to consolidate multi-jurisdictional claims, which consequently lowers the net cost of
such litigation. 130 The motive behind fee-shifting clauses, while
slightly different, has the same net effect of lowering litigation
costs for corporate defendants. 131 Fee-shifting clauses have and
be adopted in the same manner as forum-selection clauses;
is why the Delaware Supreme Court in ATP Tour held that
fee-shifting provisions were facially valid. 132 Fee-shifting
clauses, which seek to allocate "risk among parties in intracorporate litigation" govern the internal affairs of the corpora133 Forum-selection clauses simply affect the procedure of litiin no way affect the rights of shareholders to file
claims against the corporation. However, under the theory that
bylaws are contracts, should this allow corporations to essentially
limit a shareholder's ability to file claims?
2. Relationship to Arbitration Clauses
clauses can be seen as a cousin to forum-selection
clauses since such clauses require parties to resolve problems
the public court system. 134 One important distinction
regarding
clauses is the legislative support of the
Federal Arbitration Act ("FAA"), which favors arbitration. 135 Sevdecisions of the Supreme Court of the United States have
the ability of courts to invalidate such clauses. In AT&T
v. Concepcion, the Supreme Court stated, "The
purpose' of the FAA is to 'ensur[e] that private arbitraagreements are enforced according to their terms."' 136 In
Express Co. v. Italian Colors Restaurant, the Court held
the FAA, a court cannot invalidate a contractual

130. Winship, supra note 111, at 16.
131. Id. at 52-53.
132. See ATP Tour, Inc. v. Deutscher Tennis Bund, 91 A.3d 554, 559-60 (Del. 2014).
133. ATP Tour, 91 A.3d at 558.
134. See Winship, supra note 111, at 19. Compare this to forum selection clauses,
which also "oustD" the otherwise default court from jurisdiction. Id. at 13.
135. Federal Arbitration Act, 9 U.S.C. § 2 (1925) ("A written provision in ... a contract
evidencing a transactio~ involving commerce to settle by arbitration ... shall be valid, irrevocable, and enforceable.").
136. 563 U.S._,_, 131 S. Ct. 1740, 1748 (2011) (quoting Volt Info. Scis. v. Ed. of Trs.,
489 U.S. 468, 478 (1989)).
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waiver of class arbitration, because "the fact that it is not
the expense involved
proving a statutory remedy does not con137
stitute the elimination of the right to pursue that remedy."
discussing a conflict between the arbitration clause and
antitrust laws, the Court held that antitrust laws did not guaran138
tee an "affordable" procedure to vindicate claims. In fact,
tration clauses can be enforced for claims alleging violations
federal securities laws. 139 While the FAA explicitly supports
tration clauses, Verity Winship points out that these cases
be understood as part of a movement towards a permissive atti140
tude to private ordering of procedure."
In applying the Court's analysis of arbitration clauses to feeshifting clauses, we can establish an indirect relationship.
the FAA supports arbitration clauses, the PSLRA indirectly supports fee-shifting clauses. 141 The purpose of Congress enacting the
PSLRA was to cure abusive practices plaguing securities class actions.142 The PSLRA imposes sanctions for frivolous litigation by
including a presumption in favor of awarding attorneys' fees for
violations of FRCP Rule 11. 143 Before the PSLRA, such awards
were entirely at the court's discretion. 144 Now the courts are required to make a finding regarding compliance with FRCP Rule
11; if the court finds non-compliance, mandatory sanctions are to
be imposed. 145 By making these sanctions mandatory with a presumption of attorneys' fees and costs, Congress has essentially
enacted legislation supporting fee-shifting. Analyzing a feeshifting clause under Italian Colors, fee-shifting clauses adopted
146
either in a corporation's articles or bylaws are contracts. Furthermore, fee-shifting clauses do not eliminate a shareholder's

137. 570 U.S._, _, 133 S. Ct. 2304, 2311 (2013).
138. Id. at 2309.
139. Cf Goldberg v. Bear, Sterns & Co., 912 F.2d 1418, 1420 (11th Cir. 1990) (per curiam) (affirming the lower court's decision that federal securities claims were not included
in the parties' arbitration agreement, implying that, had they been, the securities claims
would have been subject to arbitration as well).
140. Winship, supra note 111, at 14.
141. Goldberg, 912 F.2d at 1420; Rebalancing Litigation Risks, supra note 37, at 1009.
142. Rebalancing Litigation Risks, supra note 37, at 1009-13.
143. 15 U.S.C. § 78u-4(c) (2012).
144. See Rebalancing Litigation Risks, supra note 37, at 1016 .
145. Id.
146. See Am. Express Co. v. Italian Colors Rest., 570 U.S._,_, 133 S. Ct. 2304, 2311
(2013).
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147. Rebalancing Litigation Risks, supra note 37, at 1032.
148. FED. R. Crv. P. ll(b)(2). Plaintiffs and plaintiffs attorneys are aware of the heightened pleading standards required in the PLSRA and that bringing a claim that is insufficient to pass, or is easily rebutted at, the class certification stage can be viewed as bringing a speculative claim. Rebalancing Litigation Risks, supra note 37, at 1039. As with
speculative claims, plaintiffs presume that the defendants are more likely to settle rather
than attempt to defend the allegations. See id. at 1015.
149. ATP Tour, Inc. v . Deutscher Tennis Bund, 91 A.3d 554, 556 (Del. 2014).
150. A decision on the enforceability of the fee-shifting bylaw in ATP Tour has not yet
been handed down. Id. at 560.
151. See, e.g., Rebalancing Litigation Risks, supra note 37, at 1047.
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152. Coffee, The Case for Preemption, supra note 108, at 8.
153. Id. at 3.
154. 480 U.S. 1, 2 (1987).
155. Id. at 2-3. The 10% penalty is calculated as 10% of the judgment. Id. at 3.
156. Id. at 6-8.
157. Id. at 8.
158. Coffee, The Case for Preemption, supra note 108, at 4; see FED. R. Crv. P. 11 (allowing discretionary sanction for violations of Rule ll(b)). Coffee uses the term "discretionary"
because it is the court's prerogative to issue sanctions based on the court's analysis of
whether FRCP Rule ll(b) has been violated. See 15 U.S.C. § 78-u4(c)(2) (2012); Coffee, The
Case for Preemption, supra note 108, at 4.
159. Coffee, The Case for Preemption, supra note 108, at 4.
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unsuccessful. 160 The Court reasoned that the state
purely procedural nor did it conflict with the
state law required a bond upfront, it still had the same effect as
fee-shifting because the defendant would receive the
if
plaintiffs were unsuccessful. 162 The main difference between the
bond requirement and a fee-shifting clause would
the timing of
163
putting up the money. Coffee distinguishes Cohen from lOb-5
claims on the grounds that: (1) Delaware has no substantive
implementing fee-shifting; and (2) the holding from Cohen applies
solely to derivative actions. 164 In contrast, lOb-5 class actions
must be brought in federal court, which has exclusive subject
matter jurisdiction over such claims. 165
But the fact still remains that bylaws are viewed as contracts
under Delaware law, which can modify the American
typically used by Delaware courts. 166 This leads back to an analysis
under Atlantic Marine. Coffee notes that under
fee-shifting provisions need to be consistent with
54(d)(2) and 23(h), which deal with notice
hearing requirements.167 It would not be a daunting task for corporate
to
include language that complied with these rules, as they are not
restrictive. 168 Furthermore, Coffee argues that broad, one-sided
fee-shifting conflicts with the policies enacted by Congress
through the PSLRA. 169 Specifically, the PSLRA provides a "presumption" in favor of fee-shifting if the court finds a
of
170
FRCP Rule ll(b). The same conflict arose
road, with the Court pointing out the mandatory-versus171
discretionary language of the bylaws and
is
160. 337 U.S. 541, 543, 557 (1949).
161. Id. at 555-56.
162. Id. at 544-45, 555.
163. Compare id. at 545 (requiring a bond to be posted prior to the case), with Coffee,
The Case for Preemption, supra note 108, at 6 (noting that fee-shifting requires payment of
expenses after the case is complete).
164. Coffee, The Case for Preemption, supra note 108, at 12 n.13.
165. Id.
166. See ATP Tour, Inc. v. Deutscher Tennis Bund, 91 A.3d 554, 558 (Del. 2014); Coffee, The Case for Preemption, supra note 108, at 4.
167. Coffee, The Case for Preemption, supra note 108, at 5.
168. See id. at 5-6 (explaining that FRCP Rules 54(d)(2) and 23(h) create minimal restrictions).
169. Id. at 7-8.
170. Id. at 8; see 15 U.S.C. § 78-u4(c) (2012).
171. Burlington N. R.R. Co. v. Woods, 480 U.S. 1, 7 (1987).
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next section, fee-shifting clauses, properly limcases, should be upheld under Atlantic Marine.

lbstantive law
applies
class actions
subject

:i as contracts
:an
;o an analysis

FRCP Rules
.
.
1nng requireate
to
3
are not
>ad, one-sided
Congress
Jvides a "prea violation of

fatory-versus1
is why,

case), with Coffee,
equires payment of

58 (Del. 2014); Cof·

create minimal re-

Forum-selection and arbitration clauses select "a decision maker and a set of
but do not change existing court procedure."112
motives, method of adoption, and contractual relabetween fee-shifting and forum-selection are almost
identical. The relationship between fee-shifting and arbitration
clauses is a little more indirect, in that there is federal law supporting enforcement of arbitration clauses. 173 One issue that remams
is whether federal courts will enforce feeshifting clauses. The remainder of this comment applies all the
implications and analyses previously discussed to fee-shifting
clauses specifically tailored to class action lOb-5 claims invoking
the
of reliance. This application shows how
and
federal courts should enforce fee-shifting clauses that
are
to
presumption of reliance.
LEVELS THE PLAYING FIELD FOR FRAUD-ON-THEMARKET

The purpose of this section is to explain how and why feeprov1s10ns
solve the implications of Halliburton II,
I. The section looks at how tailored fee-shifting
federal statutory scheme and case analysis declauses
The discussion then looks at Halliburton Ifs
scribed
potential effects on securities class action litigation. The section
concludes on the endgame of implementing fee-shifting provisions
and
results are beneficial to both shareholders and corporations.
comment is strictly limited to lOb-5 class actions invoking
presumption of reliance. 174 The reason behind applying fee-shifting clauses to this specific type of claim is so that
such clauses
hold up under judicial analysis, as previously
172. Winship, supra note 111, at 19.
173. See Federal Arbitration Act, 9 U.S.C. § 2 (2012).
174. See Basic Inc. v. Levinson, 485 U.S. 224, 250 (1988). As already mentioned, a discussion of the potential effects of broad, sweeping fee-shifting clauses, covering numerous
types of potential claims, is outside the scope of this comment. For a more detailed discussion on the broader scope of fee-shifting, see Winship, supra note 111, at 27-28; Sean J.
Griffith, Correcting Corporate Benefit: How to Fix Shareholder Litigation by Shifting the
Doctrine on Fees, 56 B.C. L. REV. 1 (2015).
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discussed. 175 The solution presented
this comment seeks to
presumption, while at the same
giving corporate defendants an economic opportunity to rebut the presumpFee-shifting clauses will prompt defendants not to seek early
settlement because it is more cost effective,
instead to rebut
the presumption. This will ultimately lead to a narrowing of the
issues in such claims and
also weed out frivolous cases by requiring plaintiffs to file suits with sufficient merits. 176 Furthermore, such limited fee-shifting clauses
help the circularity
problem since cases will be less likely to settle and the shareholders
not be merely transferring wealth
one pocket to another. The ultimate goal is the reduction
the number of such
have been empirically shown to destroy shareholder wealth. 177
LIMITED SCOPE AND ENFORCEABILITY OF FEE-SHIFTING
PROVISIONS
Much of the commentary on fee-shifting clauses discusses their
use in terms of broad sweeping language and the consequences of
such provisions. 178 Many of these arguments are why this comment suggests fee-shifting clauses be narrowly tailored to the
class certification stage of lOb-5 class actions invoking Basie's
presumption
reliance. Corporate attorneys
draft feeshifting provisions as proposed here
have to make sure the
scope of these fee-shifting clauses specifically relate to such
claims. The primary reason for sufficiently limiting the scope
they will stand up to judicial scrutifee-shifting clauses is so
ny and will provide a stronger case against preemption.
As previously discussed, the PSLRA added language to the '34
that creates a presumption of fee-shifting if the court finds a
179
A conflict arises because the lanof FRCP Rule 1
guage provided by the PSLRA allows for two-way fee-shifting,
while fee-shifting clauses would impose a mandatory one-way
175. See supra Part II.B.
176. These consequences of fee-shifting clauses fall in line with the policy reasons for
Congress enacting the PSLRA. See supra Part LB.
177. See U.S. CHAMBER INST. FOR LEGAL REFORM, supra note 8, at 4.
178. See, e.g., Winship, supra note 111, at 5.
179. Coffee, The Case for Preemption, supra note 108, at 7-8; see 15 U.S.C. § 78-u4(c)
(2012).
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15 U.S.C. § 78-u4(c)

180. Coffee, The Case for Preemption, supra note 108, at 8.
181. Id.
182. See In re Star Gas Sec. Litig., 745 F. Supp. 2d 26, 38-40 (D. Conn. 2010) (imposing
fee-shifting on plaintiffs for filing frivolous securities fraud claims) .
183. See Halliburton II, 573 U.S. _, _, 134 S. Ct. 2398, 2416 (2014); see also supra
Part I.C.
184. Halliburton II, 573 U.S. at_, 134 S. Ct. at 2416.
185. See id. at_, 134 S. Ct. at 2415.
186. FED. R. CIV. P. ll(b)(3) (requiring that "the factual contentions [made to the court]
have evidentiary support or, if specifically so identified, will likely have evidentiary support after a reasonable opportunity for further investigation or discovery"); see, e.g., In re
Star Gas Sec. Litig., 745 F. Supp. 2d at 36-37.
187. FED. R. CIV. P. 12(b)(2)-(3); Winship, supra note 111, at 13.
188. See Federal Arbitration Act, 9 U.S.C. § 2 (2012).
189. See supra Part II.B.
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(mandatory shifting of fees from defendant corporation to plaintiff
shareholders) does not indicate that the clause conflicts with the
PSLRA. 190 The one-sided fee-shifting clause and the two-way
mandatory sanctions of the PSLRA are not mutually exclusive.
Furthermore, simply making fee-shifting mandatory on one party
would not exclude the court from finding that a defendant violated FRCP Rule ll(b), and therefore requiring a defendant corporation to pay the plaintiffs' attorneys' fees.
Lastly, the language of such fee-shifting clauses should-and
will likely have to-contain language regarding claims against
clause itself. It only seems fair to not enforce fee-shifting
clauses in claims alleging wrongdoing in the adoption of feeshifting clauses. Presumably, these claims will be derivative acalleging a breach of duty by the board of directors who unilaterally adopted a fee-shifting bylaw. But since, as recommended
above, the scope of a fee-shifting clause is limited to only lOb-5
191
class actions, this should not be an issue in the first place.
Proper limitations on the scope of fee-shifting clauses should
allow such clauses to withstand judicial analysis similar to that
which was applied to forum-selection and arbitration clauses.
This is because there are readily apparent relationships between
192
fee-shifting, forum-selection, and arbitration clauses. Thus, it
can be deduced that fee-shifting clauses applicable only to lOb-5
class actions are supported by Congress and logically do not create any dissonance with federal securities laws. The analysis of
fee-shifting clauses does not end here, however. The effects of feeshifting will not only impact the wallets of parties involved
lOb-5 class actions, but will also affect certain stages of litigation.

Effects on Litigation
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190. One-sided fee-shifting would enforce the mandatory sanctions of the PSLRA on
the plaintiffs if they violated FRCP Rule ll(b) by insufficiently proving price impact, the
foundation of FOM reliance.
191. The scope of the fee-shifting clause will not cover breach of duty claims.
192. See supra Part II.B (discussing the similarities between an arbitration clause and
a fee-shifting clause).
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193. See supra Part LC. Plaintiffs will attempt to prove price impact either indirectly
or directly, and defendants will attempt to directly prove a lack of price impact.
194. Halliburton II, 573 U.S._,_, 134 S. Ct. 2398, 2417 (2014).
195. See supra Part LC.
196. See Streett & Pennington, supra note 72, at 4 (predicting that the class certification stage will become a battle of the experts).
197. See id. This is assuming that the plaintiff class alleges that the corporation made
multiple misrepresentations.
198. See supra notes 56-63 and accompanying text.
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settlement amount based on event studies produced by the plainexperts, a
can simply compare the size of the price
settlement amount. 200 However, the high frequency
of settlement has been identified as one of the major issues concerning securities class actions due to inadequate compensa201 The
of inadequate settlement awards is one of the
class action litigation destroys shareto note that class action settle203
ments
approval. However, the problem is that
judges
not
enough evidence
front of them to
204
decide
a
amount is
A detailed explanaof the settlement analysis is outside the scope of this comthe analysis "amount[s] to asking only
206
rough justice to the claim." The incen199. See supra Part LC.
200. If the settlement award is too low, the judge will also be able to use the event
studies to ascertain an equitable settlement award.
201. U.S. CHAMBER INST. FOR LEGAL REFORM, supra note 8, at 5-6.
202. See id. at 6. Plaintiffs attorneys usually take a substantial percentage of any settlement award before distributions are paid to the plaintiff class. Id. at 5.
203. Griffith, supra note 174, at 19.
204. See id. at 20.
205. For a more thorough analysis, see generally id. at 19-25.
206. Id. at 20.
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Fee-shifting clauses are intended to deter
less claims.
obvious consequence of a fee-shifting clause is
that it puts plaintiffs in the situation that corporations currently
face: paying the fees
sides. 208 This potential
on
act as a
fee-shifting clause will force
that they know or reasonably believe
to bring
survive class certification, to avoid paying
defendants' at209
torneys' fees.
deterrence is the main purpose of feeshifting clauses, the limited scope of the clauses proposed
this
comment will not completely eliminate securities class action
suits; the
on plaintiffs will simply weed out
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The effects
fee-shifting clauses could even
potentially
the plaintiffs. One potential benefit is that the

ble to use the event
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207. See supra Part III.
208. Bainbridge, Privately Ordered Solution, supra note 106.
209. See Greene, supra note 64; Liz Hoffman, Shareholder Suits May Prove Costly: Ruling Upholds Bylaw Requiring Loser to Pay Winner's Legal Fees, WALL ST. J. (May 18,
2014), http://www.wsj.com/articles/SB10001424052702304908304579565850165670972.
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plaintiff class is more likely to succeed at trial on the merits since
210
class certification will require stronger proof of price impact.
By requiring plaintiffs who cannot make it past the class certification state to pay the corporation's attorneys' fees, the circularity problem is diminished. As noted previously, the problem of
circularity arises because shareholders receive any settlement
amount from a defendant corporation. 211 Since shareholders are
the investors in a corporation, any amount paid by the corpora212
tion decreases the value of the corporation. If a defendant is
able to prove a lack of price impact and the court decides not to
certify the class, this is the end of the class action suit. At this
point, assuming a district court applies the American Rule, the
shareholders will still see a decrease in the value of their investment in the corporation. This is because the corporation incurred
substantial litigation costs. While under the American Rule, the
plaintiff class will have to pay their own litigation costs, so the
costs to the corporation are not doubled. 213 However, by adopting a
fee-shifting clause, defendants would be able to recover their litigation costs and thus restore shareholder value.
Several possible outcomes are likely to occur if a corporation
can stop a claim at the certification stage. One outcome is that
the parties will enter into settlement agreements favoring
corporation. 214 This assumes the settlement agreement
not
require the corporation to pay the plaintiffs' attorneys' fees. The
other outcome is that the corporation will move to recover fees according to its fee-shifting clause. Again, the corporation will not
be paying the plaintiffs' attorneys' fees. Because corporations
not have to incur the plaintiffs' attorneys' fees, and
recover
their litigation costs, shareholder value is restored. The effect of
210. See Frankel, supra note 64.
211. See supra note 82 and accompanying text.
212. See supra note 83 and accompanying text. This is assuming the shareholders of
the plaintiff class remain shareholders of the corporation from the beginning of the class
period through the payment of the settlement. As noted earlier, shareholder wealth can
further decline if the shareholders of the plaintiff class differ from the current shareholders. U.S. CHAMBER INST. FOR LEGAL REFORM, supra note 42, at 6.
213. Griffith, supra note 174, at 6.
214. A settlement favoring the corporation can take on numerous forms. For example,
the settlement agreement could require the corporation to pay nothing. At the very least
corporations will likely push for an agreement that does not require them to pay the plaintiffs attorneys' fees. See U.S. CHAMBER INST. FOR LEGAL REFORM, supra note 8, at 19 (noting that on average, plaintiffs' attorneys' fees were 18% of the settlement).
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fee-shifting clauses does impose a heavy burden on plaintiffs if
are
to certify as class. However, this heavy burden
seems necessary due to the ineffectiveness of current deterrence
methods. 215
is worth mentioning that the problem of circularity is not resolved by fee-shifting clauses if the defendant is not able to defeat
class certification. In addressing this concern, fee-shifting clauses
also deter corporations from settlement in cases based on
speculative allegations since they will have a higher probability of
rebutting price impact. As noted earlier, the problems with current settlement agreements are the root of the circularity problem
inadequate consideration. 216 As more cases move on to trial,
awarding of attorneys' fees is left to the courts. This is because the scope of the fee-shifting clauses proposed by this comment does not cover decisions reached on the merits. The type of
fee-shifting clauses proposed here will only require plaintiffs to
reimburse the defendant if they fail to certify as a class.
Corporations that adopt such clauses clearly seek to deter
securities litigation. By adopting a fee-shifting clause,
corporations will set up a defensive strategy that provides several
benefits. First, the amount of claims brought against the corporation will decrease. This is because speculative claims are less liketo be brought as plaintiffs consider the potential burden of a
fee-shifting clause. Second, even if claims are brought, defendants
are now incentivized to rebut price impact. If successful, the de'-'-"-'-'A<.U'-'"' will recover their litigation costs and the shareholders'
investments will be restored.
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IMPLICATIONS OF FEE-SHIFTING PROVISIONS

The adoption
fee-shifting clauses tailored to lOb-5 class actions will cause a substantial change in current securities litigaThe purpose of this section is to identify several apparent
implications for corporations adopting fee-shifting clauses. While
the scope of this comment is limited to lOb-5 class actions, the
commentary on the future of fee-shifting clauses has primarily focused on broad fee-shifting clauses. However, any action taken
215.
216.

See Bainbridge, Privately Ordered Solution, supra note 106.
See supra notes 82-88 and accompanying text.
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Delaware legislature had tabled discussions of fee-shifting clauses until early 2015. See
Rickard, supra note 1.
218. See Coffee, The Case for Preemption, supra note 108, at 1. There are already a
growing number of companies adopting such bylaws, and support from the Delaware legislature will give the go-ahead to any corporations currently on the fence about fee-shifting
bylaws. Id.
219. See id.
220. Id. at 2.
221. Claims will likely be brought as a breach of duty by the board of directors. See Jeff
C. Dodd & James Edward Maloney, Delaware Supreme Court Finds Fee-Shifting Bylaw
Permissible, ANDREWSKURTH (May 15, 2014), http://www.andrewskurth.com/assets/pdf/
article_1074.pdf.
'
222. Presumably courts will apply the ATP Tour analysis. See supra Part II.A
223. See Coffee, The Case for Preemption, supra note 108, at 2.
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224. Kevin LaCroix, Oklahoma Legislature Adopts Derivative Litigation Fee-Shifting
Provision, D&O DIARY (Sept. 25, 2014), http://www.dandodiary.com/2014/09/articles/corpo
rate-governance/oklahoma-legislature-adopts-derivative-litigation-fee-shifting-provision/.
LaCroix points out that the Oklahoma bill is much narrower than the fee-shifting bylaw
approved by the Delaware Supreme Court. Id.
225. Id.
226. The revenue generated by incorporation fees and franchise taxes has the ability to
comprise 30% of Delaware's budget. Delaware lawyers have a substantial influence over
the state legislature. See Bainbridge, Public Choice Lens, supra note 101.
227. See Coffee, The Case for Preemption, supra note 108, at 2; see also supra Part N.
228. See supra text accompanying notes 39-49, 139-45.
229. Bainbridge, Privately Ordered Solution, supra note 106.
230. Id. (citing Stephen J. Choi, Assessing the Cost of Regulatory Protections: Evidence
on the Decision to Sell Securities Outside the United States 4 (Yale Law & Econ., Research
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companies to move back overseas
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with the empirical
system
securities litigation
of shareholder wealth, 232 should provide
Congress to seriously consider reform.

measures taken on the extreme ends of the spectrum
cause more
good. For example, a complete
on fee-shifting clauses will, at a minimum, allow current
action
full support
broad feerelated to securities litigation, on the other
to severely limit securities class actions,
. f rau d regu l at1on.
. 234
antiThese ·

concerns should signal to the SEC that
fee-shifting clauses should be given serious considtestifying to the SEC Investor Advisory Commitout
potential actions that the SEC could
clauses. 235 First, the SEC, as amicus curiae,
in cases with no FRCP Rule 11
SEC could refuse to accelerate registracompanies
a fee-shifting clause in
the SEC could
companies to
registration forms that fee-shifting clauses
securities laws. 238 Lastly, the SEC could refee-shifting clauses as a major "risk facuu;cu::;::;i11~ these potential actions, Coffee also provides

Paper No. 253, Mar. 21, 2001), available at http://ssrn.com/abstract=267506).
231. See id. (citing MICHAEL R. BLOOMBERG & CHARLES E. SCHUMER, SUSTAINING NEW
YORK'S AND THE US' GLOBAL FINANCIAL SERVICES LEADERSHIP 75, 77 (2007); Howell E.
Jackson, Summary of Research Findings on Extra-Territorial Application of Federal Securities Law, in GLOBAL CAPITAL MARKETS & THE U.S. SECURITIES LAWS 2009: STRATEGIES
FOR THE CHANGING REGULATORY ENVIRONMENT 1243, 1253-54 (Practicing Law Inst.
2009)).
232. See id.; U.S. CHALV!BER INST. FOR LEGAL REFORM, supra note 8, at 5-6.
233. See supra note 223 and accompanying text (describing the possible effects of a
complete ban in Delaware).
234. See Bainbridge, Privately Ordered Solution, supra note 106 (describing how current securities litigation deters fraud).
235. Coffee, The Case for Preemption, supra note 108, at 8-9.
236. Id. at 8.
237. Id.
238. Id. at 9.
239. Id.
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